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The crisis of 2008 has shown the unsustainability of the global imbalances centered on the US-
China symbiotic relationship that characterized the previous decade. This has revived the so-called 
growth-rebalancing debate. In particular, the new emerging consensus calls for a re-orientation of 
the US economy away from consumption and toward exports, and for policy shifts that can help 
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with a radical shift in the growth strategies of both countries. We also believe that this scenario will 
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The United States has accumulated persistent and large current account deficits vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world in the last three decades. This phenomenon, however, has accelerated remarkably 
since the early 2000s, especially due to the different growth models characterizing, on the one hand, 
the US and, on the other hand, many developing countries. In particular, the relationship between 
the US and China has heavily influenced the evolution of global imbalances in the last decade and, 
as we shall argue, it will continue to do so also in the future.  
By preserving an undervalued exchange rate, China has so far managed to boost its high-
productive exporting sectors, foster the growth of GDP, attract FDI, and absorb a large amount of 
rural workers in the modern sectors of the economy, thus facilitating the process of urbanization. To 
implement this regime, the authorities have strictly controlled the exchange rate (mainly against the 
US  dollar),  limited  the  degree  of  international  capital  mobility,  maintained  a  high  degree  of 
domestic financial repression (also to facilitate the sterilization of foreign reserves), and guided the 
allocation of domestic investment among alternative uses.
1 High domestic saving and a politically-
driven  allocation  of  credit  would  have  led  to  a  serious  misallocation  of  capital  and  expanding 
nonperforming loans in China, had it not been for the stable exchange rate and for the consequent 
opportunities  of  exporting  to  the  US  market.  The  US,  in  its  turn,  has  exploited  the  Chinese 
willingness to finance its current account deficits to maintain high domestic consumption, while 
ensuring  low  interest  rates  and  subdued  inflation.  The  US  financial  sector,  in  addition,  has 
flourished thanks to the profitable intermediation of Chinese saving and to the fees associated with 
the issuance and the placement of a fast-growing amount of private debt.  
Dooley  et  al.  (2003,  2004a,b,  2009)  have  diffusely  analyzed  the  features  of  such  Sino-
American  arrangement  and  argued  that  it  represents  the  core  of  a  new  international  monetary 
arrangement,  also  know  as  Bretton  Woods  II.  Be  this  latter  observation  as  it  may,  the  Sino-
American arrangement has been certainly crucial for the successful development strategy in China 
and for the expansion of consumption in the US. The crisis of 2008, however, has made apparent 
that the size of the imbalances could not remain as those in the preceding years. Were this the case, 
the US would eventually face the reduction of the relative size of its economy, the decline of its 
manufacturing sector, and the risk of a reproduction of its recent internal problems, such as excess 
                                                 
♠ We would like to thank CEIC Data for their kind assistance in providing data on the Chinese economy.  
1 Reserves accumulation has been pursued also for a self-insurance motive, as globally integrated developing economies 
tend  to  face  foreign  exogenous  shocks  and  potential  reversals  of  private  capital  flows.  See  Aizenman  and  Lee 
(2007,2008), Dooley et al (2004c), Jeanne and Ranciere (2008).   2 
liquidity, overleveraging, underpricing of risk, and low saving (see, on this, Obstfeld, 2010). China, 
in  turn,  would  face  permanently  subdued  domestic  consumption,  rising  sterilization  costs,  very 
limited  monetary  policy  independence,  and  mounting  risks  of  overinvestment  and  capital 
misallocation. 
In  the  last  few  years,  several  studies  have  advocated  policy  shifts  aiming  to  rebalance 
Chinese growth away from external demand, investment and current account supluses, and toward 
domestic demand, consumption and services (see Aziz, 2006; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006; Guo 
and N’Diaye, 2009b; Kuijs and Wang, 2006; Lardy, 2006; Makin, 2006; Prasad, 2009; Prasad and 
Rajan, 2006; Straub and Thimann, 2009; Zheng et al., 2009). More recently, scholars and a part of 
the economic press have emphasized that the US needs change as much as China does: global 
rebalancing  has  to  be  accompanied  by  an  internal  rebalancing  in  the  US,  whereby  the  country 
becomes less dependent on domestic consumption and debt, and more oriented toward exports and 
saving. 
While it is certain that large imbalances can hardly be maintained, we claim that an improper 
rebalancing of the Sino-American relationship may bring about also costs to both countries. For 
sure, a rapid closure of the imbalances will permanently reduce the room for China’s export-led 
growth strategy and for the expansion of US consumption. Ceteris paribus, this will most likely 
lead to unpleasantly lower rates of growth in both countries.
2 In addition, such a dramatic shift in 
the countries’ models of growth may have unpleasant structural effects.  
The  negative  implications  of  a  correction  in  the  Chinese  policy  mix  on  the  economy’s 
longer-term growth prospects and on the ongoing structural change driven by the export-led growth 
have already been discussed in the literature (see, for instance, Bonatti and Fracasso, 2009,2010; 
Hua, 2007; McKinnon 2006,2007; McKinnon and Schnabl, 2009; Rodrik, 2009a,2009b). As the 
key to China’s buoyant growth has been the rapid transition into producing tradable products, a 
dramatic switch in the Chinese model of growth which holds back the process of structural change 
may reduce the economy’s longer-term growth rate and may also complicate the mobilization of the 
Chinese labor force away from the backward sectors of the economy. 
 What has been less debated in the literature, instead, is that down-sizing the Sino-American 
imbalances  might  have  unpleasant  consequences  on  the  US  consumers  -  whose  consumption 
opportunities will shrink as Chinese policy-makers slow down the financing of the US  current 
account deficits – and of the US workers - as making the US economy less dependent on domestic 
                                                 
2 Similarly, Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) argue that failure to properly address the determinants of the global 
imbalances in the last 10 years (which, as also done in Fracasso, 2007, they distinguish from the determinants of the 
imbalances in the 1990s) may lead to the world economy toward a low-growth trajectory.   3 
consumption and more oriented toward exports might bring about a relative shrinking of those 
labor-intensive nontradable sectors that provide most jobs in the country (see Bonatti and Fracasso, 
2010). The US workers may face an even gloomier scenario if the American policy-makers in order 
to rein in fiscal deficit will drastically cut government expenditures that usually mainly fall on 
nontradable products. 
Thus, the US and China face serious challenges in choosing and implementing new growth 
strategies that are economically feasible, politically viable and compatible with each other and with 
the rest of the world. While it is reasonable that both China and the US will adopt measures with a 
view to preventing global imbalances from widening again, they should use great care in choosing 
the combination of policy interventions to achieve this result. Down-sizing the US deficits and 
redressing the imbalances, in fact, will be a difficult and politically costly task.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After having offered a few stylized facts on 
the  Sino-American  co-dependency  (Section  2),  we  shall  point  out  the  economic  and  political 
economy trade-offs faced by China and the US (Section 3) in either maintaining or moving away 
from their current growth strategies. Section 4 will conclude. 
2. Stylized facts  
 
Both the US and China have run increasing trade and current account imbalances since 2003, but 
for the recent and probably temporary reduction following the financial crisis. In 2007, the Chinese 
current account surplus exceeded 10% of GDP and the US deficits reached 6% of GDP in 2005 and 
2006 (Figure 1).  
While China accounted for about 20% of the US deficits in early 2000s, its share has raised 
to above 40% in more recent years: China’s vantage position in international manufacturing supply 
chains has increased its relative share of the total US trade deficit and reduced the share ascribable 
to the other Asian countries. Even though these figures shrunk in 2009 because of the consequences 
of the global crisis on GDP and trade, imbalances have not necessarily started a permanent process 
of decline: the reduction in the size of the imbalances, in fact, is most likely the by-product of the 
greater decline observed in trade figures than in the values of GDP.
3 In addition, the US continues 
to account for three quarters of the Chinese trade surplus. 
                                                 
3 Baldwin and Taglioni (2009) show that the interaction of the demand shock provoked by the financial crisis with the 
composition of trade and GDP (i.e., the latter involves a larger proportion of postpone-able products than the former) 
exaggerated the fall in trade values and also reduced the external imbalances. While GDP growth in China was barely 
dented (also thanks to the fiscal stimulus package put in place by the Chinese authorities), its exports fell by almost 15%.   4 
While both the public and the private sectors have recorded external deficits in the US, only 
the official sector in China has been allowed to intermediate capital abroad.
4 The Chinese monetary 
authorities, charged with investing both large current account surpluses and capital inflows, have 
accumulated  foreign  reserves,  mainly  denominated  in  US  dollars.
5 Prasad  and  Sorkin  (2009) 
estimate that the current account surpluses accounted for 91% of the accumulation of reserves from 
2004 to 2008. In early 2010, thanks to the large purchases of foreign currency in the course of 2009, 
Chinese reserves reached almost $2.5 trillion, about 50% of domestic GDP.
6 On the contrary, the 
net international investment position of the US has worsened over time notwithstanding favourable 
valuation effects and capital gains: the latter have in fact prevented a dramatic worsening of the US 
net foreign position and guaranteed a positive return differential.
7  
Chinese reserves have been typically concentrated on US Treasury (UST) securities. China’s 
holdings amounted to $60bn in 2000, $400bn in 2006, and have fluctuated around $900bn in the 
second  half  of  2009.  The  Chinese  net  purchases  of  long-term  US  Treasury  bonds  and  notes 
accounted for about 30% of all countries’ purchases in 2008 and 2009. The relative importance of 
China among the foreign owners of US Treasuries has also constantly grown (see Figure 2). The 
share of foreign-owned US assets in Chinese hands ($1.7 trillion in November 2009) is even greater 
if one looks at long-term US Agency bonds, while it is much less pronounced for short-term debt, 
corporate bonds and equity (see Figure 3).  
Until  2008,  to  hold  down  liquidity  growth  while  accumulating  reserves,  the  Chinese 
authorities undertook a massive sterilization effort. In 2002, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
started issuing RMB-denominated sterilization bills which the Chinese banking sector has been 
forced to buy: local commercial banks have been required to keep part of their own reserves in 
                                                 
4 Even though the outflows of capital have been almost liberalized already in 2007, the expected appreciation of the 
renminbi has restrained domestic investors from bringing capital abroad and, de facto, financial flows have remained 
mainly inward-oriented. Precisely to limit the inflow of money, China tightened the rules on foreign-currency transfers 
by individuals on November 25
th, 2009. 
5 It is widespread opinion that 60%-70% of the Chinese foreign reserves is denominated in US dollars. 
6 Chinese total reserves may in fact be even larger if one considers that a) the People’s Bank of China has controlled the 
Chinese banks’ external asset purchases, b) a Sovereign Wealth Fund (CIC) financed with $200 billion of official 
reserves was established in 2007, and c) non-Chinese intermediaries have purchased a great amount of foreign assets on 
behalf of the Chinese public sector. 
7 The US has profitably intermediated the resources coming from emerging markets: it has gathered foreign saving by 
issuing liquid and low-yield securities, and reinvested them in more profitable domestic and foreign direct investments. 
See Caballero et al (2008), Dooley et al. (2007) and Mendoza et al. (2009) on the US intermediary role and Gourinchas 
and Rey (2007a,b) and Tille (2008) on the return differential and valuation effects.   5 
dollars and to accumulate sterilization bills (up to 40% of total reserves in 2007).
8 The issuance of 
sterilization bonds has been suspended from 2008 to April 2010 as the authorities aimed to let the 
liquidity grow as a means of stimulating the economy. 
  In 1994, after having abolished exchange rate controls on current account transactions, the 
Chinese authorities pegged the renminbi at 8.28RMB per dollar: this undervalued exchange rate has 
helped China to expand its tradable sector while anchoring the domestic price level. To avoid a too 
fast growth of the domestic liquidity, incompatible with a low inflation environment and allegedly 
conducive to domestic asset bubbles, in 2005 the authorities allowed for a limited appreciation of 
the currency and switched to a managed float with reference to a basket of currencies. As a result, in 
the three year period from July 2005 to July 2008, the renminbi gained 20% against the dollar. 
Since mid-2008, the RMB has been re-pegged to the dollar at 6.83RMB per dollar, probably as a 
response  of  the  Chinese  authorities  to  the  short-lived  appreciation  of  the  dollar  against  most 
currencies due to the unwinding of carry trade positions and the diffuse sales of foreign-currency 
assets to pay back dollar-denominated debts (Figure 4).
9 Accordingly, the Chinese and American 
effective exchange rates appreciated hand in hand on a trade weighted basis until 2005
10, they 
diverged in the period 2005-mid2008 and went back to a common depreciating pattern since mid-
2008. 
The overvaluation of the dollar against the renminbi (whose extent varies a lot across studies 
aiming  to  estimate  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate)  appears  more  clearly  if  one  considers  the 
evolution of the wage differential in dollars between the US and China.
11 As argued in Ferguson 
and Schularick (2009), while the nominal exchange rate has depreciated by 15% in the period 1998-
2008, relative unit labor costs have decreased in China by 40%: even controlling for differences in 
labor productivity, closing the competitiveness advantages enjoyed by the Chinese manufacturing 
firms would require an appreciation of the renminbi of 40%-50%.
12 
                                                 
8 See Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008), Zhang and Pang (2008) and Zhang (2009) for the evolution of monetary series. 
9 The inception of the financial crisis led to a short-lived recovery of the dollar in the second half of 2008, but the 
depreciating trend started again in early 2009 when these hot money flows into the US abated (Bénassy-Quére et al., 
2009; Frankle, 2009; Frankel and Wei, 2007; Fratzscher, 2009). 
10 Fracasso and Schiavo (2009) show that the effective depreciation of the USD until 2006 was substantial against the 
currencies of the major partners, but not concentrated on the countries with the largest bilateral surpluses. 
11 See, for instance, Cheung et al (2007), Cline and Williamson (2009), and Ferguson and Schularick (2009). 
12 Banister and Lett (2009) estimate that average hourly compensation costs for China’s manufacturing sector in 2006 
were $0.81. This amounts to 2.7% of the average costs of manufacturing employees in the United States. While this 
ratio has increased in the period from 2002 (when manufacturing employment expanded again) to 2006, part of this 
catching up is due to the appreciation of the renminbi rather than to the increase in compensation costs.   6 
Naturally,  current  account  imbalances  have  reflected  the  differentials  in  saving  and 
investment patterns in each of the countries. Domestic saving in China has typically been very high 
(above 40% of GNI in early 2000, it touched 50% in 2007), while investment, notwithstanding a 
steady growth in the last decade, has never reached the same level. Chinese saving surpluses in the 
period 2000-2008 amounted to almost $1.4tn. The contrary holds for the US whose net borrowing 
needs have risen up to 5-6% of gross national income in recent years. The US outspent its national 
income for several years in a row, thus accumulating more than $4.5tn of saving deficits in the 
period 2000-2008. 
As  anticipated,  the  Sino-American  co-dependency  owes  much  to  the  extraordinary  high 
saving and investment rates in China. The export-led growth cum reserve accumulation strategy 
pursued by the Chinese authorities has both required and entailed high personal saving over time: i) 
the currency has remained undervalued; ii) households have faced serious borrowing constrained, 
and iii) the social safety net (with the so-called “breaking of the iron rice bowl” system) has become 
weaker  (see  Blanchard  and  Giavazzi,  2006;  Chamon  and  Prasad,  2010).
13 Two  demographic 
changes in the population have also contributed to increase domestic saving: i) a rapidly falling 
youth  dependency  ratio  pushes  saving  (Ma  and  Haiwen,  2009)
14 and  ii)  families  with  a  son 
accumulate precautionary wealth to compete in the ‘marriage market’ given that, also as a result of 
selective abortions, young men outnumber young women (see Wei and Zhang, 2009).
15  
Chinese enterprises have also accumulated high saving through retained earnings, which 
have risen as firms’ profits, capital intensity and labor productivity have grown fast over time. 
Private entrepreneurial firms – at risk of being financially constrained because of the limited access 
to the political-driven banking system – have accumulated precautionary savings and invested in 
their own capital expansion.
16 State-owned enterprises, on their part, have typically not distributed 
dividends (although firms operating in rapidly expanding list of sectors have been recently required 
to  do  so)  and  re-invested  in  physical  capital  their  profits,  thus  contributing  to  keep  high  both 
domestic demand and production capacity.  
While the US gross capital formation remained stable in the period 2000-2008, domestic 
saving  steadily  fell:  net  private  saving  halved,  net  government  saving  turned  negative  and  net 
                                                 
13 These explanations are not mutually exclusive and they contribute to explain saving patterns in different times.  
14 Using micro-data, Horioka and Wan (2007) and Chamon and Prasad (2010), however, reach different conclusions on 
the empirical relevance of dependency ratios to explain saving patterns. 
15 According to Wei and Zhang (2009) the sex ratio has climbed from 106 boys per 100 girls in 1980 to 124 in 2007. 
16 Song  et  al  (2009)  discuss  the  importance  of  the  borrowing  constraints  faced  by  small  private  firms  in  China. 
Interestingly, Aziz and Cui (2007) argue that borrowing constraints and undistributed profits are also responsible for the 
decline of household income share (and in particular of the wage income share) in GDP.   7 
corporate saving did not compensate for the reduction in the other two. The reduction in personal 
saving and the stability of investment may be partially accounted for by the presence of a housing 
and credit bubble. Households’ borrowing and debt growth started abating in the third quarter 2008 
and private saving increased in 2009, as households tried to rebuild part of the lost financial wealth 
and to service the debt (see Figure 5).
17 Such additional saving has been smaller than the increasing 
borrowing needs of the public sector: most likely, the US is going to remain a net borrower from the 
rest of the world also in 2010. The sum of household and federal government borrowing in credit 
markets has not changed much in the last few years: $1.48 trillion in 2005, 1.36 in 2006, 1.1 in 
2007, 1.26 in 2008 and 1.20 in 2009. 
Until 2008, both China and the US enjoyed satisfactory rates of growth. In the US, this 
result was in great part due to the expansion of the housing sector and of private consumption, while 
net exports fell and investment remained constant. Though hit hard by the crisis, the US seems to 
have started recovering in 2010, thanks to the domestic fiscal stimulus package the accommodating 
monetary policy. In China, overall real GDP growth has remained above 8% in the decade (above 
10% from 2004 to 2007) and foreign demand, directly and indirectly, has played a crucial role in 
this process. Growing exports have pushed up the demand for domestically produced goods and 
have attracted large foreign investment in the tradable sector, which, on their part, have boosted 
business and consumer confidence. Guo and N’Diaye (2009) estimate that export and investment 
linked to the tradable sector accounted for 60% of GDP growth during 2001-2008, up from 40% in 
the 1990s.
18 As said, final consumption growth in China was instead muted as a result of a declining 
share of households income in GDP coupled with high personal saving (on this, see Aziz and Cui, 
2007). 
                                                 
17 According to the Flows of Funds data (table B.100), released in December 2009, household wealth was equal to 
$64.5 trillion in 2005 and 2006 (almost 6.5 times the personal disposable income), fell to $48.5tn in the first quarter of 
2009 and recovered up to $54.2tn (just below 5 times the personal disposable income) in the fourth quarter of 2009. 
18 The contribution of exports to Chinese growth is highly debated as growth accounting exercises do not pick up the 
respective shares of value added ascribable to domestic production for foreign and internal demand. Some authors have 
looked at the input-output structure of the Chinese economy and separated ordinary and processing exports because of 
their different implications in terms of value added and employment creation (see Feenstra and Hong, 2007; Koopman 
et al., 2008; and He and Zhang, 2010). According to these studies, Chinese exports have been less important than 
usually believed. These findings, however, employ a static analysis (as final domestic demand is treated as exogenous), 
use  2002  I-O  tables  and,  furthermore,  do  not  consider  direct  and  indirect  implications  that  an  outward-oriented 
production system typically has on regulatory reforms, technological transfer, competition-induced efficiency gains and 
total factor productivity growth.   8 
3. Growth strategies and trade-offs  
3.1 China 
 
In  recent  years,  several  studies  have  advocated  policy  shifts  that  may  help  to  rebalance 
Chinese growth. As discussed in the introduction, this strand of the literature has correctly pointed 
out that the growth strategy pursued so far by China entails costs (and risks) that increase with the 
size  and  the  duration  of  the  imbalances.  Accordingly,  many  scholars  have  argued  that  China’s 
growth should move away from heavy dependence on external demand, investment and industry, 
and toward domestic demand, consumption and services.  
As  to  the  implied  costs  of  this  strategy,  the  continuation  of  the  export-led  cum  reserve 
accumulation  would  require  the  maintenance  of  a  permanently  subdued  levels  of  household 
consumption and income, the preservation of strict capital restrictions, the further exposure of the 
value of the reserves to the oscillations of the dollar, the maintenance of low interest rates to keep 
compressed  the  cost  of  investment,  and  the  subjugation  of  the  domestic  banking  sector  to  the 
political leadership. While in the past the opportunity costs of this strategy were lower than the 
gains obtained from mobilizing the rural population in the modern sectors of the economy, in the 
future this is not likely to be the case.  
In the past, for instance, the sterilization of reserves has been facilitated by the high return 
differential  between  US  bonds  and  PBC  sterilization  bills  and  by  the  high  degree  of  financial 
repression in China.
19 But sterilization costs are doomed to increase: the direct (quasi-fiscal) costs 
of this practice will go up if the US interest rates will remain low for a long period; moreover, the 
(indirect)  costs  (e.g.,  a  liquidity  overhang  in  the  banking  system;  widespread  asset  portfolio 
distortions; currency and maturity mismatches in banks’ assets and liabilities; the inability of the 
authorities to liberalize the domestic interest rates) will increase with time and with the size of the 
expected appreciation of the renminbi.  In addition, a prolonged undervaluation of the currency 
would attract large speculative capital flows into China if investors start doubting its sustainability, 
thereby increasing the amount of reserves to be sterilized, as happened in 2003-2005 before the 
exchange rate regime shift (discussed in Section 2).
20  
                                                 
19 See Aizenman and Glick (2009), Greenwood (2008), and McKinnon and Schnabl (2009). Until 2008, to control 
liquidity growth, the Chinese authorities resorted to restrictive administrative measures and used “moral suasion” to 
convince banks to buy sterilization bills and hold PBC reserves remunerated at rates lower than the  market ones: 
interest rates could not be raised as this would have attracted capital inflows and increased the costs of sterilization. 
20 As  market participants anticipated the appreciation of the RMB, net financial inflows doubled in 2004. Foreign 
investors’ prophecy was self-fulfilling: the Chinese authorities were forced to revalue as they were both facing troubles 
in  sterilizing  the  inflows  and  losing  any  monetary  policy  independence.  China  also  endured  international  political   9 
In addition, the maintenance of the export-led growth strategy is likely to be more difficult 
in the future than it was in the past because of the enlarged size of China’s economy.
21 The country 
has  grown  very  rapidly  and  a  further  expansion  of  its  market  shares  cannot  but  cause  serious 
reductions in those of its competitors. As the support for free trade has declined among people and 
policy-makers in developed countries, the Chinese attempt to penetrate further into foreign markets 
could lead to a protectionist backlash, which would eventually reduce the opportunities for China.
22 
Similar considerations hold for the maintenance of high domestic saving and investment in 
China. Keeping investment high has typically required both high retained earnings of the corporate 
sector (above 20% of GDP), in particular of state-owned enterprises, and low (if not negative) real 
interest rates: these, as well as the depreciated currency, have contributed to compress household 
income and consumption to an extent that might be hardly maintained by the Chinese leadership in 
the future. As ever more often reckoned by the elite of the ruling party, some social and economic 
reforms will have to take place before economic and social imbalances become entrenched.  
As argued by Yao (2010), the probability that the current policies that Beijing adopts to 
promote GDP growth may infringe on people's economic and political rights is growing over time. 
It is thus likely that the authorities will push for the development and the liberalization of the 
domestic financial sector, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the establishment of a 
more generous and inclusive social safety net. As these changes will contribute to reduce domestic 
saving, China might eventually slow down the accumulation of current account surpluses, thus 
simultaneously  redressing  its  external  and  internal  imbalances.  This,  of  course,  will  occur  if 
investment will not decrease as much as saving, which could however happen as a by-product of the 
attempt to achieve greater capital efficiency.
23 
While acknowledging that the preservation of the strategy adopted so far is difficult, in what 
follows we shall offer arguments on why we tend to exclude the occurrence of a rapid and abrupt 
change  in  the  Chinese  growth  strategy.  The  literature  advocating  a  change  in  Chinese  policies 
                                                                                                                                                                  
pressures to make more flexible the currency, whose undervaluation was held responsible for the bad fortune of US and 
European exporting sectors.  
21 China has a very large productive capacity in several manufacturing sectors: as to steel capacity, for instance, China 
overcomes the US and the EU in both total and per capita terms. 
22 Bown and McCulloch (2009) discuss the WTO-consistent trade policy measures that the US has adopted to slow the 
growth of its trade imbalances with China. 
23 The debate on the prospective size and growth of Chinese investment is still open. While Dollar and Wei (2007) and 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) argue that a more efficient allocation of capital could limit over-investment without denting 
economic  growth,  others  observe  that  investment  remains  profitable  (Bai  et  al.,  2006)  and  that  its  allocation  has 
improved over time (Song et al., 2009). It should however be noticed that, even though total investment may remain 
high, its growth in the future can hardly occur at rates similar to those observed in the most recent years.    10 
overlooks that the key to China’s buoyant growth is the rapid transition into producing tradables 
(mainly  manufactures):  a  premature  correction  in  China’s  policy  mix  which  slows  down  this 
process of structural change may result in the reduction in the economy’s longer-term growth rate 
(Rodrik 2009a,2009b).
24 This would be incompatible with the goal of fostering the employment of 
rural workers in the modern sectors of the economy and with other foreign policy objectives. If 
investment and external demand will diminish as advocated by those claiming a reduction in the 
domestic Chinese imbalances, Chinese consumption will have to growth 5 times faster than in the 
past  in  order  to  preserve  the  overall  growth  rates  around  10%:  this  can  hardly  materialize,  in 
particular if the household income to GDP ratio will keep on shrinking as it has done since 1999.
25 
Moreover,  as  argued  by  the  PBC  Governor,  Mr  Zhou  Xiaouchuan,  the  abovementioned 
reforms and changes in the habits and practices of households, enterprises and institutions will be 
only gradual, as they are well entrenched (as in the case of households’ habits) and, taken together, 
have served well the multifaceted development goals of the Chinese authorities. The financial sector 
will most likely remain repressed as this condition facilitates capital and liquidity controls, reserve 
sterilization, and the sectoral and geographical allocation of capital. Similarly, the influence of local 
authorities on banks is unlikely to be relieved soon as this represents a key tool for them to boost 
local economic performance, which contributes to their visibility before the central government and 
enhances their chances of being re-appointed. Finally, an untimely change in the growth paradigm 
that reduces growth by few percentage points may turn out to be politically unsustainable even 
more than a maintenance of subdued household consumption: a serious restructuring process will 
most likely imply (at least in the short term) job dislocations and losses, rising unemployment, 
cross-regional migration, the closure of banks exposed to the recent boom in credit and asset prices, 
and the reduction of the municipalities’ control on corporate investment. 
We thus doubt that the national authorities are ready to accept the political consequences of 
a dramatic revision of their growth strategy because they are hardly compatible with the need of 
equalizing the standards of living across the provinces while preserving a leading political and 
economic role in the region. In March and April 2010, when the US Administration announced to 
                                                 
24 Consistently, the exchange rate regime switch in 2005 was neither abrupt and nor profound: the authorities were 
concerned about the negative valuation effects of a large depreciation of the dollar (which would have hit both the 
official  reserves  and  the  US  assets  held  by  the  commercial  banks)  and  about  the  future  of  the  export-oriented 
manufacturing sector (see McKinnon, 2006; McKinnon and Schnabl, 2009).
  
25 Bonatti and Fracasso (2009) build a theoretical model to interpret the Sino-American co-dependency and evaluate 
some different future scenarios depending on whether China liberalizes the capital account and floats the currency, on 
its fiscal policies and on the timing of the regime switch. Other theoretical works on the structural change in China are 
Lipschitz et al. (2009) and Song et al. (2009).   11 
postpone the release of the Treasury report on exchange rates in which many had expected China to 
be labeled as a currency manipulator, official and unofficial statements by various Chinese officials 
were  contradictory:  some  declared  that  the  country  would  move  soon  toward  a  more 
flexible/market-oriented exchange rate, and others maintained that China would not give in to US 
pressures on the exchange rate as these latter impinge on China’s sovereignty and on its growth 
strategy. Accordingly, while a resumption of the pre-crisis gradual appreciation of the renminbi 
seems very likely, the complete abandonment of the current model of growth is more economically 
and politically controversial.  
This  does  not  entail  that  there  are  no  important  signals  that  the  Chinese  authorities  are 
pondering a change in their strategy. During the last few years, the monetary authorities in China 
have repeatedly changed the composition of their purchases of US assets and publicly expressed 
their reservations on the effects of the US quantitative easing on the real value of US foreign debt. 
Moreover, during the first half of 2009, the authorities took actions to encourage the international 
use of the renminbi: they established bilateral local currency swaps (for more than RMB600bn) 
with  some  commercial  partners;  started  pilot  programs  using  the  renminbi  in  cross-border 
settlements;  promoted  investment  opportunities  in  Hong  Kong  for  foreign  holders  of  renminbi; 
participated in regional monetary cooperation and reserve pooling arrangements; diversified the 
reserves by agreeing in purchasing IMF SDR-denominated bonds (thus asking more voice, power 
and representation in the IMF and WB); and put forward the proposal of introducing a “super-
sovereign” reserve currency in place of the US dollar.
26 Finally, the PBC governor proposed that 
G20 countries establish a “supra-sovereign-wealth investment fund” to invest foreign reserves in 
developing countries, and, in a similar vein, the influent economist Xu Shanda, in mid-2009, argued 
that China should create a Marshall plan of $500bn to lend money to developing regions. 
This notwithstanding, one can find opposite signs showing that China is not yet ready to 
adopt  a  new  growth  strategy.  Despite  the  crisis,  US-dollar  denominated  Chinese  reserves  have 
continued to grow in 2009 as the Chinese authorities, albeit concerned about the security of their 
US investments, could not but buy US assets (flows) to prevent a sharp reduction in the value of 
their  current  holdings  (stocks).  In  addition,  at  the  APEC  meeting  in  mid-November  2009,  the 
Chinese authorities made clear that a revaluation of the renminbi, though possible, would not be 
immediate  and  certainly  not  a  matter  of  regional  policy  coordination.  Moreover,  despite  much 
debate, the diversification of the reserves has remained limited: there are neither many alternative 
currencies to the dollar and the euro, nor many financial markets that are deep and liquid enough to 
bear the impact of  a diversification of $2.5bn  worth of reserves. No  major changes have been 
                                                 
26 See Zhang M. (2009) for a discussion of the China’s new international financial strategy.   12 
implemented  in  China  to  reduce  the  degree  of  financial  repression,  which  guarantees  that  the 
sterilization costs remain low. 
It is also worth noticing that the tertiarization trend in China has been strong in terms of 
employment, but not significant in terms of real value added. As labor productivity has stagnated in 
the tertiary sector, relative prices have boomed (see Cheng and Blanchard, 2009) thus explaining 
the growing share of services in the households’ consumption baskets. If this structural gap in the 
evolution of relative prices is going to continue, a limited increase in domestic demand may not be 
sufficient to compensate the reduction of foreign demand for tradables, especially because Chinese 
trade flows have concentrated more on manufactures (above 85% since 2001) than on services. 
In light of all these considerations, we believe that the proposals of establishing a “Chinese 
Marshall plan” and a “supra-sovereign-wealth investment fund” are not only driven by the desire of 
diversifying the accumulated reserves and extending the international adoption of the renminbi. 
They  are  also  (and  foremost)  meant  to  expand  the  export  markets  for  China  in  the  attempt  to 
preserve an export-driven model of growth. The authorities most likely believe that: a) exports still 
remain indispensable to ensure/absorb the growth of domestic production; b) mature markets alone, 
even leaving the contractionary effects of the crisis aside, cannot allow for a further expansion of 
Chinese market shares; c) domestic demand in China is not going to increase as much as necessary 
to absorb the growth in domestic production consistent with the labor mobilization goals of the 
authorities; d) expansionary economic policy measures cannot sustain domestic growth without also 
feeding financial bubbles and inflation. These proposed solutions would allow China to differentiate 
the denomination of its reserve holdings and the destinations of its products, while simultaneously 
maintaining an export-led growth strategy. 
It has been argued that, with the measures adopted to tackle the global economic crisis, 
China has already switched away from export-led growth: a massive fiscal stimulus package and an 
extremely loose monetary policy, accompanied by restrictive trade and procurement measures, have 
fostered  domestic  demand  after  the  collapse  of  external  trade.
27 Government’s  extraordinarily 
expansionary measures, however, do very little to lessen the internal imbalances in China. Quite on 
the contrary, they have probably contributed to make domestic imbalances worse, as they i) boosted 
                                                 
27 The fiscal stimulus package amounted to 4 trillion of renminbi (about $575billion). This implies a central government 
intervention as big as 15% of China’s GDP, about three times the stimulus measures adopted by the US. To this, one 
should also add the local stimulus plans (mainly financed through banks’ loans) which, combined all together, appear to 
be as large as the central government’s package. During 2009, the Chinese government encouraged commercial banks 
to concede generously credit to the private sector: loans reached 9 trillion of renminbi ($1.4tn), 30% more than the year 
before. Mortgage lending increased of over 40% and property development loans of about 30% in the course of 2009: 
as a consequence, property sales and prices have skyrocketed during 2009.   13 
fixed asset investment (from 42% to 47% of GDP in 2009); ii) increased the size of banking loans 
(in particular to state-owned companies) and of prospective non-performing loans (due to excess 
industrial  capacity);  and  iv)  fed  the  increase  in  the  price  of  financial  and  commodity-related 
assets.
28 With the exceptions of a tax cut on the purchases of certain vehicles and of increased bank-
financed borrowing by households, none of the expansionary policy measures has produced the 
much desired and publicly advocated permanent increase in Chinese households’ consumption, also 
because of their temporary nature. Moreover, as discussed in He et al (2009), the fiscal stimulus has 
mainly fallen on sectors (and geographical areas) others than those in which most of the crisis-
induced 20 million job-losses materialized: once the stimulus will start abating, it is possible that 
problem  regarding  the  sectoral  allocation  of  employment  will  emerge.  As  of  early  2010,  the 
expansionary stance of monetary policy has already been reverted to prevent the overheating the 
economy and the credit-driven inflation of property prices: fiscal policy is expected to follow a 
similar pattern.
29 Thus, it should be clear that neither the stimulus package nor its unwinding do 
signal any permanent switch in China’s growth strategy.  
3.2 United States  
 
In parallel with the debate on the alleged necessity of a change in China’s growth model, 
policy  makers  and  commentators  are  invoking  the  need  for  the  United  States  to  re-orient  its 
economy away from consumption and toward exports. It is argued that the current improvements in 
the US external deficits are mostly the transitory side effects of the international trade collapse: in 
the absence of some major shift in US policies the recovery of trade flows will probably return the 
US to its pre-crisis path (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2009) and the global macroeconomic conditions 
that brought on the current crisis will be replicated. The risk of a new, even more devastating crisis 
will be exacerbated (Bergsten, 2009b). Furthermore, if the US external deficit climbs again to its 
pre-crisis level, the consequent rapid increase in foreign indebtedness is deemed to have serious 
long-term implications for the American power positions in world affairs (Posen, 2009). In fact, 
                                                 
28 See Pettis (2010) on this. For a contrarian view, instead, we refer to Lardy (2010). 
29 Since late 2009, banks have been urged to reduce rapidly the size of their loans (and, not surprisingly, commercial 
bank loans have slowed substantially in early 2010). The China Banking Regulatory Commission reinstated mandatory 
lending  quotas,  increased  the  required  reserve  ratio  by  50  basis  points  in  January  and  February,  and  disallowed 
subordinated debt as a source of two-tier capital (which contributes both to increased required reserves and restrain new 
loans). By the same token, in mid-April 2010, the central government required its banks to review off-the-book loans to 
local governments. On April 8, 2010, the PBC started selling sterilization bills (worth around 15 billion of renminbi) 
again, a practice suspended on June 2008 to allow the expansion of liquidity in the economy.   14 
prolonged and large negative income transfers to the rest of the world - which Bergsten (2009b) 
estimates might reach 7% of GDP in 2030 - cannot but reduce the living standards in the US.
30 
Avoiding this scenario, therefore, should be a priority for the US policy makers not only 
because of the risks that it implies for the economy, but also for its long-term consequences on 
American national security.
31 The balancing of the federal budget is the policy instrument that is 
advocated  for  achieving  that  structural  reduction  in  absorption  and  increase  in  national  saving 
which can prevent a persistent build up of external deficit and debt (Bergsten, 2009a): the fiscal 
stimulus, which is likely to remain above $500 billion for some years, created a large fiscal deficit 
which contributes to worsen the borrowing needs of the country. Consistently with this standpoint, 
the US authorities should also encourage the process whereby other currencies will increasingly 
flank the dollar as reserve currency, so as to drain that source of demand for US assets which 
pushes up the dollar’s exchange rate, “hurting US competitiveness and creating even larger US 
external  deficits”  (Bergsten,  2009b).  In  other  words,  a  reduction  of  the  “exorbitant  privilege” 
enjoyed by the US because of the international status of the dollar is judged necessary for curbing 
the American tendency to act as the “world consumer of last resort”.  
The issue then boils down to whether the US authorities and private sector will adapt and set 
in the abovementioned rebalancing process. Available data on both public and private consumption 
do not suggest this is in fact the case. To start, retail sales have grown fast in early 2010, making up 
for  more  than  half  of  the  drop  recorded  since  mid-2008,  and  also  personal  consumption 
expenditures have recovered. Accordingly, since late 2009, personal saving (i.e. disposable income 
minus total personal outlays) as a ratio of disposable income has declined to pre-crisis level (see 
Figure 6). This is not surprising in light of the non-negligible, though modest, employment gains in 
early 2010 and the positive wealth effects experienced since the second half of 2009. In addition to 
this, federal government fiscal deficits have expanded and, as we shall discuss below, they will very 
hardly shrink in the years ahead. 
                                                 
30 Before the crisis of 2008, some economists (Cooper, 2006; Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2006) argued that  the 
positive income balance in the US was a convincing proof that the imbalances were not a disequilibrium condition, and 
certainly not bad for the US. As argued elsewhere (Fracasso, 2007), this conclusion was grounded on the assumption 
that what occurred in the last decade would have been permanent simply because it had been long lasting. 
31 Under this respect, it is apparent the analogy with the American dependence on imported fossil fuels: in evaluating 
the convenience for the US to incur the short-term costs necessary to diminish this dependence, it is often stressed that 
one should consider not only the long-term economic benefits of diminishing this dependence, but also the strategic 
dividends coming from a reduced exposure to conflicts in regions involved in the production and transportation of gas 
and oil.   15 
In March 2010, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released an analysis of perspectives 
for the budget and the economic outlook both assuming unchanged legislation and incorporating the 
President’s  budgetary  proposals  for  the  Fiscal  Year  (hereafter  FY)  2001.  Assuming  unchanged 
legislation, the federal government deficit, equal to 3.2% of GDP in FY2008, passed 10% of GDP 
in FY2009 and is projected to decline in 2010 and level out at 3.1% of GDP in FY2013 (above 
$500bn).
32 The federal debt held by the public, amounting to 40.8% of GDP at the beginning of 
2008, is expected to reach $10.5tn in 2012 (i.e., 67% of GDP) and then stabilize between 65% and 
70%  of  GDP  in  the  following  years.  These  projections  would  imply  that  the  net  interest  rate 
payments on the debt held by the public will more than double in terms of GDP in 2019 with 
respect to 2009. 
As said, these projections do not encompass prospective policy changes: they build under 
the assumptions that certain tax provisions (as those enacted in the Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, and 
the  American  Recovery  and  Reinvestment  Act)  expire  as  scheduled,  assume  that  discretionary 
spending rises at the rate of inflation, and do not take into account the Health Care Legislation, the 
reform of the US international tax system, the Build American Bonds Program, and other proposal 
affecting spending and revenues. Once the implications of the President’s proposals for the FY2011 
are taken into account, the CBO projections change: the federal deficit is expected to grow above 
10% of GDP in FY2010, steadily decline toward 4% in FY2014 and then increase up to 5-5.5% in 
the following fiscal years. By the same token, the debt in public hands is expected to reach 70% of 
GDP in 2011 and 90% in 2020.
33 
Although the rhetoric of the Obama administration seems to indicate that a re-orientation of 
the US growth model is in its agenda,
34 one could doubt of the political and economic feasibility of 
the structural adjustment that this re-orientation would make necessary. Such a re-balancing, indeed, 
would put an end to a long period in which Americans were used to live beyond their means. It 
would require a drastic reduction of the budget deficit that is projected for the next decade (Cline, 
2009),  with  inevitable  cuts  in  expenditures  and  tax  increases  which  would  make  the  trade-off 
between butter and guns much more stringent than in the G.W. Bush’s years. Moreover, it would 
                                                 
32 On average, the deficit as percentage of GDP has been equal to 3.9 during the decade 1980-1989, 2.2 in 1990-1999, 
1.5 in the period 2000-2008: this implies an average of 1.9 in 1990-2008 and of 2.6 in 1980-2008. 
33 These CBO projections differ from those provided by the Office of Budget and Management (OBM) because of 
diverse baselines (due to the different policies considered as current law) and technical assumptions. In addition, OBM 
projections are based on assumptions on the rates of GDP growth which look more optimistic of those used by the CBO.  
34 See President Obama’s statements at the meeting of his Economic Advisory Board on November 2, 2009. See also 
Summers (2009).   16 
imply that private consumption will persistently grow at a lower rate than GDP, which in its turn is 
expected  to  grow  less  than  in  1995-2007.  As  argued  in  the  financial  press,  the  US  may 
simultaneously reduce the fiscal deficits and limit domestic consumption by levying a tax on either 
value-added  or  consumption  (as  all  other  industrial  countries  do),  increasing  individual  income 
taxes (for instance by downsizing some tax deductions limiting the tax base), and targeting US 
firms’ foreign income. However, it is legitimate to be quite skeptical about the possibility that these 
measures will be actually implemented by any Administration, given the high political price that it 
will pay because of them. 
Fiscal adjustment would imply that government revenues go back to, and then beyond, pre-
crisis levels: they dropped from 17.7% of GDP in FY2008 to 14.8% of GDP in FY2009, the lowest 
level in 50 years. Raising government revenues seems the most viable way for reducing the fiscal 
deficit since the overall effective federal tax rate declined from 22% of income in 1979 to 20.5% in 
2005 and the mere expiration of some tax reductions would increase individual income taxes in the 
next 10 years. But higher taxation remains largely unpopular. It is not by chance that the President’s 
budgetary  proposals  for  the  FY2011  make  individual  income  revenues  grow  more  slowly  than 
under unchanged legislation. Similar considerations apply to a reasonable shift from progressive 
income taxation toward regressive consumption taxation. In other words, changing the domestic tax 
system so as to reduce both domestic private consumption and government deficits will be hardly 
achieved: the current structure of the US government revenues has deep roots in the US society.
35 
An important issue, yet oddly marginal in the current debate on the US rebalancing, is the 
fact that a growth model less dependent on domestic demand and more oriented toward exports 
would bring about a relative shrinking of those sectors producing non (internationally) tradable 
goods and services that are particularly labor intensive. This is confirmed by looking at the average 
share of  compensation  accruing to labor and  capital services over the  period 2000-2007 in the 
diverse sectors of the US economy (see also Cova et al., 2009). The shares accruing to labor in the 
nontradable service sectors (accounting for three quarters of US employment) are in the range 70%-
90%,  whereas  the  average  shares  in  the  tradable  manufacturing  and  agricultural  sectors  are 
respectively 65% and 55%.
36 This point is particularly relevant considering the sectoral composition 
of US employment, as revealed by the plot in Figure 7. In 2008, the share of manufacturing in the 
non-agricultural employment was less than 10% (down from 16% in 1990) while the shares of trade, 
                                                 
35 On average, over the fiscal years 2003-2009, 44% of the revenues came from individual income taxes, 11% from 
corporate income taxes, 37% from social insurance. 
36 For these calculations we used the dataset EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts (November 2009 Release) 
discussed in O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).   17 
services, and (Federal, State and local) government were, respectively, 15%, 46% and 16% (17%, 
38% and 17% in 1990). It is thus highly unlikely that a structural adjustment increasing the relative 
importance of the tradable sectors may have a positive impact on employment. 
It is worth recalling that the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), although taking into 
account  the  short-term  depressing  effects  of  the  economic  crisis  and  other  structural  changes 
affecting the US economy over time, does not project for the next decade any major changes in the 
sectoral composition of employment. The BLS projections for employment over the period 2008-
2018, presented in the November 2009 issue of the Monthly Labor Review, are drawn against an 
underlying macroeconomic background that reflects little (if any) change with respect to the recent 
past. Personal consumption expenditure is projected to continue its growth, even though at a slower 
rate than in the past decades, thus passing from 67% to circa 70% of nominal GDP, contributing for 
three quarters of the annual 2.4% growth rate in real GDP forecasted over the period 2008-2018. 
Moreover, service-providing sectors are expected to generate the great majority of the new jobs 
from 2008 to 2018.
37 As a result, employment of wage and salary workers is expected to grow by 
11% (14 million) only in the high-skilled service sectors (in particular, professional and business 
services +14%, health care and social assistance related jobs +24%) and in the construction sector 
(+19%), while it is expected to decline in all good-producing sectors (manufacturing -9%, mining -
5%) because of stiffer import competition, ongoing relocation of activities and jobs overseas, and 
further labor efficiency gains achieved at the firm level.
38 
Beside the skepticism about the US policy makers’ political strength and determination to 
voluntarily renounce to the short-term advantages coming from the foreign willingness to finance 
the US excess expenditures in order to face the unpopularity associated with a growth rebalancing, 
it is not clear what part of the world could provide the additional demand that would allow the 
United States to steadily increase its net exports so as to stabilize its current account deficit/GDP 
ratio at a level deemed sustainable in the long run,
39 without persistently slowing down its growth 
                                                 
37 Most of the aggregate projections  would not change  much if 2007, instead of 2008,  were chosen as base year. 
However, the reduction in the employment of wage and salary workers in the manufacturing and mining sectors would 
be larger, and the increase in the construction sector smaller. See Bartsch (2009), table 1. 
38 It is worth pointing out that these projections build on the plausible assumption that only the older age population 
group will increase its participation to the labor force. In terms of the population above 16 years old, people with more 
than 55 years will pass from 30.2% in 2008 (26.6% in 1998) to 35.4% in 2018 when the age of baby boomers will be in 
the range 54 and 72 years. In terms of civilian labor force, the share of 55-years-and-older workers will pass from 18% 
in 2008 (14% in 1998) to 24% in 2018. It follows that the relative contribution of low-skilled labor force is unlikely to 
decrease rapidly in the next few years. 
39 A consensus estimation of this sustainable level is 3%, namely approximately 3% points lower than its pre-crisis level.   18 
and  the  growth  of  the  world  economy.  Nor  the  other  advanced  countries  neither  the  emerging 
countries appear to be willing in the next future to manage their domestic demand so as to create 
room for a drastic and persistent reduction in the US external deficit. In particular, the successful 
performances of the emerging countries pursuing an export-led growth strategy, together with the 
recent experience showing the importance of counting on ample reserves in times of crisis, will 
probably contribute to increase worldwide the countries’ desire to run external surpluses.
40  
4. Conclusions  
 
At the core of the growth process that has characterized the world economy in the years 
preceding the crisis of 2008 there have been the high US consumption rate and the high Chinese 
exports  and  investment.  This  process  was  made  possible  by  unprecedented  high  rates  of  debt 
accumulation on the part of US households and unprecedented high saving rates on the part of 
Chinese households. As the unsustainable rise of the US private debt triggered the crisis, the direct 
and indirect transformation of relevant portions of private debt into public debt has become a pillar 
of the US authorities’ strategy for driving the economy out of the crisis. Under this respect, it is not 
superfluous to stress how important has been the worldwide trust in the creditworthiness and long-
term solvency of the US government to avoid that the mass defaults of private debtors ignited a 
systemic collapse.  
As a matter of fact, this transformation of private into public debt has been necessary for 
restoring the households’ capacity to spend and bringing again the US economy on a growth path. 
In a longer term perspective, as we have argued, it is unlikely to expect a consistent set of policies 
aiming at a structural rebalancing of the US growth model away from consumption and the non-
tradable sectors of the economy, because of the high economic and social adjustment costs—and 
the  consequent  political  unpopularity—that  they  would  imply.  If  some  re-orientation  in  that 
direction of the US economy will occur, it will be under the pressure of forces that will make it 
inevitable, possibly because of the increasing unwillingness of foreign investors to finance large US 
external deficits.  
It is apparent how crucial is for the Unites States that foreign central banks and sovereign 
funds will be willing for the next years to absorb rising quantity of US government securities. 
Although with some reluctance and after warning the Unites States of not abusing of its position for 
inflating away its foreign debt, there is evidence that China’s official sector has been making its part 
and it will continue to accumulate US government bonds. It is true that at least in the short term this 
                                                 
40 Under this respect, the point made here is not affected by the fact that emerging countries’ consumption has now 
approximately reached US consumption (each totaling about 30% of global output, see Hensley et al., 2009).   19 
choice  has  not  alternative  if  the  Chinese  authorities  want  to  preserve  the  value  of  their  past 
investment in US financial assets, but it also signals—together with the refusal of accelerating the 
appreciation of the renmimbi versus the US dollar—the awareness on the part of the Chinese ruling 
elite that a drastic abandonment of the export-led growth strategy followed until now is premature, 
risky and at odds with what they perceive are China’s long-term interests. In other words, it is likely 
that the Chinese leadership will partially reassess its development strategy only to the extent that 
this is made inevitable by the gradual restriction of the possibility for China to feed its growth by 
relying  on  external  demand  and  by  keeping  a  high  rate  of  capital  accumulation.  Indeed,  those 
suggesting that China’s growth should rely much more on domestic consumption should not forget 
that the compression of consumption has been  instrumental in recent  years to keep the rate of 
capital  accumulation  as  high  as  possible,  thus  accelerating  the  growth  process.  Boosting 
consumption in China would require a remarkable increase in real wages and a pervasive diffusion 
of  welfare  entitlements.  This  would  rapidly  raise  the  cost  of  labor  and  depress  the  return  on 
investment.  Consequently,  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  would  be  inevitably  reduced,  with 
obvious implications for economic growth.  
It should not be surprising that the Chinese ruling elite is reluctant to implement major 
changes in a set of policies that were so successful in keeping high the country’s rate of economic 
growth, which remains the policy makers’ primary objective. This notwithstanding, a growth rate 
around 10% per annum is not sustainable for China in the post-crisis global scenario: the fact that 
China’s share of world GDP is rising so rapidly and the ineluctable effects of the law of decreasing 
returns on capital investment, together with the impossibility for the United States to run external 
deficit of the extent that was normal in the pre-crisis, make very likely that China’s long-run growth 
will  slow  down.  In  combination  with  the  reduced  US  capability  of  playing  the  role  of  “world 
consumer of last resort”, the slowdown of China’s growth will have inevitable effects on the global 
economy. If public opinions and policy-makers of the major countries will not accept that after the 
crisis the world economy will enter a prolonged period of slower growth and they will then attempt 
to accelerate growth by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, it will be high the risk of a new 
and  possibly  more  devastating  global  economic  collapse,  especially  considering  that  with  the 
current crisis most governments around the world have almost entirely exhausted their space for 
intervening to bail out the economy. 
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Figure 1. Current account balances - ratio of GDP- of the US and China (lhs). Chinese share 





















Figure 2. Chinese share of foreign-owned Treasuries (%). Sources: US Treasury (TIC), end of 
the year data. 








































Figure 3. Chinese share of foreign-owned US assets (%) by type. Relative share of each type in 
the Chinese portfolio in 2009 (% over the 2009 bars). Sources: US Treasury (TIC), data at 
June of each year 
 
 
Figure 4. China and US exchange rate indices (January 1995 = 8.46). Sources: Board of 
Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (RMB/USD) and BIS (broad effective exchange rate indices). 
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Figure  5.  US  borrowing  needs  by  sectors:  Households,  Federal  and  State  and  Local 
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Figure 6. Disposable personal income (DPI) and Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) 
per capita in chained 2005 dollars [left axis]; Personal saving over DPI (percent) [right axis]. 
Jan 2001-Feb 2010. Source: BEA, 29 March 2010 
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Figure 7. Sectoral shares 1990-2007 in (form the left): Employees (EMPE); Total  Persons 
Engaged (EMPN); Full-time Equivalent Employees (FTEE); Full-Time Equivalent Engaged 
(FTEN). Source: OECD STAN
41 
 
                                                 
41 Non-market services include “Community, Social and Personal Services (code C75T99) and Real estate activities 
(code C70). Market services include all the others.   
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